Playing it safe
Dual-use research-research that could be misused to pose a threat to public safety-needs to be regulated, but the best way to do so is not straightforward at all.
Should the US government have legal authority over all dual-use research, similar to the UK's strategy? Or should researchers police themselves, despite the conflict of interests that such self-regulation may represent? There are no obvious answers to these questions, and it is fortunate that the US government has not taken the same type of 'Big Brother' approach that it has adopted in other areas relevant to its 'war on terror' . It is also fortunate that scientists have taken advantage of this opportunity for dialogue, urging stakeholders to carefully reflect on what best serves the government, the public and the scientists' own interests. As regulatory decisions of this sort might apply to all biomedical research, a cautious approach that allows time for the community to grasp all the issues relevant to the regulation of dual-use research is to be commended.
From the international perspective, the legal vacuum is even more profound. The most important international agreement on the regulation of dual-use biological agents emerged from the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which prohibited the development of biological agents for hostile purposes but did not regulate research. Also, the recommendations from the BWC are not legally binding, and the US has characteristically opposed efforts to change their status since 2001.
Aiming to fill this void, the BWC countries have held annual meetings since 2003 to promote "common understanding and effective action" on a series of biosecurity issues agreed upon in advance. For example, as this issue of Nature Medicine went to press, the 2008 meeting was taking place in Geneva, with a focus on measures to promote biosafety and on oversight, education and development of codes of conduct to prevent misuse of advances in biotechnology. Regrettably, again at the insistence of the US, the participants of these annual meetings do not have decision-making authority, raising serious doubts about their real influence.
Deciding on the right level of regulation for dual-use research, both at the national and international levels, is a difficult problem. Scientists should continue to get involved in the decisionmaking progress to make sure that their point of view is heard until clear guidelines are in place. If the outcome of this domestic discussion is successful, it may provide a blueprint for a global regulatory scheme-a sorely needed opportunity for the US to lead by example.
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